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Figure 1: Illustrative example of unwanted notification appearing during student presentation.
ABSTRACT
Technology-enhanced active learning (TEAL) spaces could repre-
sent a significant benefit to learning and teaching at universities.
TEAL spaces support students in projecting presentations (e.g. from
smart-phones) and sharing notes (e.g. from smart-watches) with
peers. Importantly, this sharing is partly amongst their co-present
small group but sometimes to the whole class. However, plugging
personal things into smart spaces whose first requirement is to
accept as many devices as possible is not without consequence.
A projected notification of a political conversation, for example,
has the potential to harm the individual both within the space
and beyond, opening them to unwanted judgment, criticism and
assessment.
The traditional argument from the usable security community
is that of intervention prior to any use whatever: users need to
be trained, taught and/or nudged to avoid such problems. We con-
ducted an informal focus group with students in a pilot TEAL space,
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exploring issues around the privacy and security of using personal
devices in such spaces. The reality is that it is hard to perceive the
privacy and security challenges prior to using the space. We argue
that such prior interventions are not only a significant barrier to
student adoption of smart spaces, but ineffective in ensuring the
safety of individuals in the long-term.
We argue that in designing smart spaces, both on-campus and
off, designers need to adopt an approach of individually evolved
privacy requirements to ensure an on-going safe, creative space for
students. Two important features are: (a) as a small group develops
bonds, its privacy level needs to be reduced over time and (b) the
best privacy level depends on the whether the screen is currently
shared with the small group or the large class.
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Applied computing→ Collaborative learning;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Technology-enhanced active learning (TEAL) with personal devices
has the potential to change higher education significantly [8, 9], but
its implementation must consider security and privacy challenges
[13] to ensure a safe, creative space for learning: safe as in being
secure against public shaming, and creative as in feeling free to
speak without the inhibition that fear-based safe actions require.
The concept of active learning can be best understood in contrast
to passive learning or ‘teach-by-telling’. The prototypical example
of passive learning is a lecture, where lecturers communicate con-
cepts to large groups of students in theatres. The solution makes
sense when knowledge is difficult to access and to transmit. How-
ever, the Internet has reduced the expense of transmitting and
accessing knowledge. Consequently, a student is no longer reliant
on a single lecturer to attain content: there are any number of
authors available via the Internet.
Therefore, in active learning the lecturer sets a pre-session ac-
tivity, for example in a usable security course, an investigation
of the concept of differential privacy. Students sift through digital
content using their smart phones, tablets or any other device. The
lecturer then sets the in-class activity, say a short presentation on
the investigated topic. Students can then craft a presentation on
their personal smart phone and plug it in for display.
The use of personal devices is central to TEAL spaces. Some
students will still use pen and paper as the tools of choice, others
may use Facebook and Google. However, the concern is that stu-
dents may not always be able to control their audience. In the prior
example, an accidental notification could overlay any presentation
as seen in Figure 1.
The reality is that universities must ensure a safe, creative space
for students - even if those spaces embrace the Internet of Things.
The concern is that universities have had decades, if not centuries, of
experience in constructing lecture spaces that are safe and creative
environments [1], e.g. at a minimum universities consider fire-exits,
but also quiet spaces where audibility of speakers and usually also of
audience questions is significantly better than public rooms such as
churches or hotels usually provide. The concern is that universities
are rapidly investing in active learning spaces without thinking of
the dangers of plugging personal devices into equipment where the
first requirement is to allow anything to connect.
The concern is that many universities may not be considering
the security and privacy challenges of active learning spaces. Al-
ternatively, some decision-makers may view such challenges as
inconveniences, rather than challenges that may improve the actual
overall experience. Nevertheless, even small decisions such as seat
choice can reflect personal privacy decisions by students [12].
Consequently, we conducted a small user study discussing the
security and privacy challenges of TEAL spaces. The users were
students who had experienced a course delivered in a TEAL space.
The contributions of this paper are:
• a small user study illustrating some of the challenges of
security and privacy.
• discussion surrounding these issues andwhy designers should
consider them when individuals are plugging personal de-
vices into sophisticated smart spaces.
Our suggestion is that this user study may offer a starting point
for decision-makers in thinking and discussing the security and
privacy challenges of education in smart spaces.
2 BACKGROUND
Higher education across the world is being challenged by the
free flow of knowledge across the Internet. Universities are un-
der pressure to remain relevant and remain competitive to attract
researchers and students alike. Sophisticated smart campuses that
support active learning are increasingly being perceived as an in-
vestment that most universities will need to make [4].
Coccoli et al. analyse the challenge for universities of the emer-
gence of pervasive networking and personal devices in the Euro-
pean context [3]. They argue that safety and health is one of the
many important aspects that needs to be thoroughly factored in
when designing smart spaces. Coccoli et al. argue that students are
not just plugging in personal tablets, but applications and services
as well, e.g. social networking services (SNSs).
The reality is that SNSs and other such applications could be
vulnerable due to the intersection with the Internet of Things in
the smart campus [2]. This suggests that while there may be con-
cerns about peers observing privacy notifications being displayed,
nefarious students could compromise an individual’s privacy, e.g.
by packet sniffing. Consequently, universities have a requirement
to ensure the safety of students’ data since they are promoting the
use of personal devices. Universities must appreciate that students
using personal devices in learning spaces will not normally be using
the devices solely for learning activities, in contrast to devices such
as desktops provided by the university for students.
Similarly, Crichton et al. demonstrated that students initially
‘resented’ the institution intruding on their personal devices [5].
They investigated the use of students using iPods, iPads and laptops
in the classroom. Crichton et al. report that students were initially
hesitant, this fades as they find the devices useful to completing
‘work-based’ tasks, e.g. reading a textbook etc. They also report
that students prefer to use a range of devices, rather than a sin-
gle device. This would suggest that smart spaces that support a
range of personal devices could be desirable to students. However,
Crichton et al. argue that sharing content and collaboration is still
an emerging challenge for the use of such devices in education. It
could be the case that students simply do not perceive personal
devices as useful for learning [16].
Nevertheless, DeBarger et al. argue that while there may be
challenges, there are also opportunities to improve the experience
of the learner in TEAL spaces [6]. DeBarger et al. consider the use
of Group Scribblers, an application that supports a mix of physical
and electronic sticky notes to consider concepts in classrooms.
DeBarger et al. argue such collaborative tools in the classroom
afford students insight into the traditionally ‘private’ practice of
teaching. Teachers frequently make decisions regarding the lesson
and student in private. However, when collaborating in an active
space, students have more exposure to the process of academic
practice.
If such spaces are about refining collaboration skills, then focus-
ing on the strategies and devices individuals use prior to entering
may be the best starting point [7]. Lampe et al. investigated the
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use of SNSs to organise classroom activities [11]. They argue that
success or failure at using such tools for collaboration hinged on
how they used it, not how important they felt the tool was or their
level of experience with it. The design and layout of the room is
also crucial to ensuring a collaborative work environment. Rogers
and Lindle argue the placement of large, interactive displays can
impede efficiency and effectiveness of collaboration [14]. Neverthe-
less, Rogers and Lindle state that designers should strive to avoid
making such displays a focal point, since some tasks will always be
better with pen and paper.
However, students can also rip a blank piece of paper from a diary,
rather than risk the exposure of personal notes to fellow students.
The reality is that all individuals have considerable skills in the
context of everyday life in managing collaboration and privacy. It
is whether or not these skills are triggered when collaborating with
applications and personal devices in active spaces.
The assumption is that either (a) these skills emerge quickly or
(b) take time to form. The expectation is that skills that emerge
rapidly within an active learning space are not new skills at all, but
transfer of existing skills and preferences [15].
It is those slowly emerging or new skills that are more interesting.
It takes time to develop a new skill in managing privacy with
personal devices in a work space. The crucial argument is whether
or not TEAL spaces are a safe environment to develop such skills.
The privacy and security challenges of such spaces may make
them unsafe. A child may make mistakes when they are younger,
but are typically shielded by their parents, e.g. their trousers fall
down, the audience is understanding, the parents can reassure.
However, students are adults and it is not clear how embarrassing
situations can be recovered from. Figure 1 illustrates an example of
an unwanted notification displayed in-class. That accidental display
could be captured and shared on SNSs and consequently, preserved
for all time. It is not clear how a student can recover.
Therefore, universities must ensure sophisticated smart spaces
are a safe environment not only for learning, but also for forging
new skills in managing privacy and collaboration. The first step is
to develop a sense of the actual privacy and security challenges in
active spaces.
3 PILOT SPACE
The user study relied on students that had experienced for the first
time a course in a pilot TEAL space. Figure 2 illustrates the layout
of the pilot TEAL space we studied. The space has four projectors
and supports up to 60 students, arranged into tables with teams of
six or eight individuals. Each table has a dedicated workstation and
two monitors. The first monitor displays locally connected devices
while the second displays whatever device is currently shared with
the class, e.g. the console for the lecturer, or the workstation of
another group.
The lecture console has an array of different display options and
devices, e.g. workstation, back-lit white board and projectors. The
central console also offers the lecturer control of the mode of the
room, either ‘lecture-style’ or ‘TEAL-style’. If in lecture mode, all
displays only show content dictated by the central room console.
However, in TEAL mode, individual tables can control what is
displayed, including their own personal devices.
The table allows individuals to connect their personal devices
over HDMI or wireless. There is also a control panel at each table,
allowing members to select which personal device to share on the
local display. The control panel also lets table members select which
device to share with the whole of the class on the large projectors.
4 USER STUDY
The focus group was conducted as an activity in a Masters-level
usable security course. The course had approximately 60 students
and was delivered over several weeks, and the focus group was
conducted towards the end of the course.
4.1 Participants
There were 21 participants involved in the focus group. Two par-
ticipants did not consent to their responses being utilised for the
purposes of research in education. The participants were all en-
rolled on a Masters course focused on usable security and had
been involved in learning and teaching in a TEAL space for several
weeks.
4.2 Apparatus
The focus group was conducted in the same pilot TEAL space used
for delivering the usable security course. The students gave open-
text responses using an in-class response system that they could
access from their personal devices or table workstation. Paper was
provided for those students that did not want to use the in-class
response system.
4.3 Procedure
The focus group was delivered towards the end of a usable security
course, that had been delivered in pilot TEAL space over a semester.
Individuals were requested to give consent to use of comments for
the purposes of research and evaluation via the in-class response
system.
The individuals gathered at tables as teams and were asked to
consider privacy and security challenges of collaborating in TEAL
spaces. Teams were asked to devise at least one question to pose to
the rest of the class. The question was to be designed to gain insight
into an aspect they perceived as a privacy and security challenge
for using such a space.
Teams could research the topic using their personal devices
and/or the workstation at each table. Participants were asked to
prepare their question for presentation to the rest of the class, again
either on their personal device or the workstation for each table.
The teams were then brought back together as a class.
Teams were then selected using a random-number generator,
and were then instructed to use the control panel for their table to
share their display, and consequently, their question with the rest of
the class. The rest of the class were expected to submit an open-text
response using the in-class response system. The responses were
then reviewed and discussed with the rest of class.
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Figure 2: Layout of pilot Technology-enhanced Active Learning (TEAL) space
5 RESULTS
The participants are here referred to by a participant identification
number, e.g. "P14". The first team selected, Team U, posed the ques-
tion of whether team mates would share personal devices in such
spaces.
Would you let another person use your personal de-
vice?
Team U
Thirteen participants provided an open-text response to the ques-
tion posed by Team U. The majority of responses (62%) indicated
that participants would let another individual at the table use their
personal device with the minority (38%) stating they would not
allow it. Nevertheless, while participants may permit others to use
their device, it would not be without concern.
“With supervision, not an issue, I can see what they
are doing; but if I couldn’t see the screen while they
were working then I would be concerned.”
Participant 19 (P19)
The comment from P19 reflected the many comments that students
would share their device while desiring some form of control. Simi-
larly, P9 stated it “depends, whether I trust him or not”. Indeed, even
those participants that would allow others to use their personal
device would only do so as the device would be properly config-
ured. P12 stated, for example, that “my personal files are hidden
and protected”. The comment from P12 was evidence of a recurring
theme of the discussion. The perception was that individuals should
actually know how to use a room’s equipment before collaborating
within it. This is evident in some of the responses from the question
posed by the next randomly selected team.
Do you feel comfortable in connecting your personal
device to the display for sharing with others?
Team V
There were a total of 12 responses to the question from Team V.
A small majority of participants responded (58%) that they were
comfortable in connecting their personal device for sharing with
others. However, the general sentiment from the group stated that
individuals should know what they are doing. P12 stated, for ex-
ample, “you should know that you have to hide your personal data
before connecting cables!”. Nevertheless, this was not the case for
all participants as evident from the response from P4.
“No. You don’t know if its going to appear on the
screen next to you, or on every screen in the room.”
Participant 4 (P4)
Similarly, P15 stated “We’re not always fully aware of the risks that
may occur when we plug in our device in public”. The concern of the
unforeseen was raised in the question from Team W.
Do you have security concerns about the actual phys-
ical connectors?
TeamW
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TeamW felt individuals may have concerns about the physical con-
nectors themselves. The team seemed to suggest that the university
environment is relatively open and accessible. They suggested that
nefarious individuals may interfere with connectors to capture data.
Ten participants provided text responses to the question from Team
W. However, a minority of students (40%) had concerns about the
physical connectors. Nevertheless, those concerns may lead to indi-
viduals not participating in activities with their personal devices as
indicated by P4.
“You can’t be 100% sure what you’re plugging your
device into, so the only way to protect your data is to
not plug it in at all.”
Participant 4 (P4)
Furthermore, from those that did not have concerns, the theme of
education emerged. P11 stated towards individuals that are con-
cerned that they should “encrypt your data”. Team X explored this
further with their question, that probed whether individuals have
concerns around personal data collection.
Do you have concerns about the collection of personal
data?
Team X
Ten participants provided open-text responses to the question to
Team X. The majority of individuals (70%) that responded to the
question were concerned about data collection. P17 essentially
expressed the sentiment on the group when they stated “Yes, there
might be personal data on a device or some confidential information
that should not be shared”. Similarly, P15 indicated that individuals
may need to adjust their expectation, suggestion that they may
“only have a reasonable expectation of privacy to a certain extent in
any public space”. Nevertheless, P12 stated an alternative position.
“No, it’s not. I’ve already sold my soul to facebook”
Participant 12 (P12)
Similarly, Team Y explored the types of personal data that individu-
als would actually be concerned about within such a space.
What personal information are you concerned about?
Team Y
Nine participants provided open-text responses to the question
from Team Y. The responses were varied with some participants
stating financial information, web browsing history, conversations.
P19 stated what many students seemed to sense was the only real
concern.
“That my personal messages would pop up over the
content.”
Participant 19 (P19)
The last team selected to pose a question was Team Z. The team
asked the most important question of the group in many ways.
Would you connect your personal devices to the space?
Team Z
Eight participants provided an open-text response to the question.
Themajority of these responses (88%) were positive with individuals
stating they would connect their personal devices to the space.
Participant P7 seemed to summarise the sentiment of most of the
group and discussion.
“Yes but I would turn off the notifications.”
Participant 7 (P7)
6 DISCUSSION
The small study reported above concerns a situation which, al-
though novel to the teacher and students involved, is by no means
technologically radical. Yet it nevertheless illustrates a number
of ways in which the usual security community approach is mis-
matched to reality. Firstly of course, by far the most common way in
which people approach new information technology is to learn by
doing: which conflicts with the usual idea in security that defences
should entirely depend on prior training.
More importantly, active learning spaces in education are funda-
mentally about having students use their personal devices. While
numerous professionals have two or more mobile phones, partly to
manage privacy between work and private life, this is not currently
the case with students. In this respect, our study represents a case
a little more urgent in forcing an intersection of an individual’s
private and professional life. Yet in practice, this is a general issue
since few professions can have a rigid policy of disallowing com-
munications about family emergencies ever to reach someone at
work: it is a general issue on how to manage such junctions safely
and satisfactorily. The current issue in the education case is how
to manage it, not just in terms of future software mechanisms, but
right now with existing devices configured primarily to deal with
private needs.
The study shows that there is not a single group to consider in
this case, but at least two (the small group of about six at a table,
and the larger whole-class group of about 60 in this case); and that
transitions between these audiences occur very quickly (one button
press) and moderately frequently. We are familiar with this in many
social situations (e.g. in restaurants where again you are in both a
small close group and a wide one of the whole room; closing the
door at home to have a row with your partner not-in-front-of-the-
kids), but this is seldom seen in software requirements. It illustrates
the rapidity with which changes are made to audience control in
everyday non-technological contexts, and the need for this to be
do-able when using internet-connected ordinary devices for such
connections to be (socially) safe.
Furthermore within a group, the level of privacy vs. openness
changes over time (cf. the chill when an outsider joins a group
and everyone changes the level of disclosure; or when two people
chatting enter a space where others will overhear them). This is a
widespread feature of groups, partly (as in the case of a new class)
as they first get used to each other, but also rapidly in the first
seconds of two people starting a conversation as in what linguists
call "alignment" where two people talking converge quickly and
unconsciously to a common loudness of speech, speed of talking,
length of pauses, and many other things – so also, we suggest, do
groups converge over time on a level of confidentiality in ordinary
chat, that may be different in each group. It is also clear that a
policy of safety first is not a solution: as one participant said, a
group member hiding what they are doing will be censured when
the group norm is sharing just as often as a person will be censured
for broadcasting when the group norm at that moment is private
discussion: the required privacy level moves both up and down.
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This requirement for moderately frequent (perhaps every 5 to 10
minutes) and very fast (within a few seconds) changes in privacy
settings is not covered by most current mechanisms of levels of
permissions, or being in and out of a Facebook group which are
much slower and clumsier to operate than these cases require.
7 LIMITATIONS
The study reported here is too limited in numbers, the range of
devices involved, and in looking only at the educational context
of a single country to be of interest as a representative of general
student experience in technology enhanced active learning. How-
ever the combination of students learning about cyber security yet
having a fresh personal experience and using their own personal
devices made for a set of comments from personal reflection that
are potentially more useful than other studies. If the students used
devices provided for them, they would lack the range of different
kinds of usage accumulated over long periods which actual per-
sonal devices have. If the students had no orientation to the issues
of security, they would mostly comment on a few events that dis-
rupted their immediate usage rather than attempting to foresee
likely future issues. If they were already well indoctrinated in the
research perspective on cyber security then they would probably
already see it mostly as a matter of incompetent and lazy users not
taking enough precautions. Thus this particular study may provide,
not reliable data on how widespread each problem is, but a set of
issues that may include some useful insights into possible security
and privacy challenges of such a space. Therefore it could be the
case here that relatively few students are enough to lead to relevant
and valid insight [10].
8 CONCLUSION
How much real disruption in practice will be caused by issues like
those raised above? The expectation is that TEAL spaces could
represent a significant benefit to learning and teaching at universi-
ties. However, while universities have considerable experience in
designing lecture theaters, they have little insight into TEAL spaces
reliant on personal devices.
In this paper, we presented a small user study to explore what
students, who had experienced a pilot TEAL space, perceived as
the security and privacy challenges of using such a space. The per-
ception from those students is that while they perceive many such
challenges, they also acknowledge the real potential of such a space.
The concern is that once a student’s privacy has been compromised,
the environment is no longer a safe space to learn. Consequently,
it is important for universities and designers to ensure that learn-
ing spaces infused with technology are safe, creative spaces for
students.
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